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Abstract 
Multinational enterprises engaging in cross-border, intrafirm trade can 
use  a  different  price  for  cost  accounting purposes  than  used  for  tax 
accounting purposes.  This possibility has not been previously modeled. 
We study the implications for how both transfer prices are set under the 
separate entity and formula apportionment approaches.  The relationship 
between the two prices in the presence of penalties for noncompliance 
with arm's length pricing is also examined.  The results are shown to be 
robust to alternative market structures and imperfect taxation. 
* Deloitte & Touche and University of Melbourne.  Correspondence: PO Box N250, Grosvenor 
Place, 225 George Street, Sydney, NSW, 1217, Australia. 1.  Introduction 
There are two essentially distinct transfer pricing literatures. One literature focuses on 
how intrafirm prices can be used to provide appropriate managerial incentives and to 
facilitate performance evaluation. Examples of studies in this literature are Harris, et al. 
(1982), Arnershi and Cheng (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1991), and Anctil and Dutta 
(1 999).  The other literature examines the implications of tax regulations governing the 
pricing of intrafirm transactions across sovereign  jurisdictions.  Included in this literature 
are Musgrave (1973), Gordon and Wilson (1986), Kant (1990), Bucks and Mazerof 
(1993), and Goolsbee and Maydew (2000). 
While the incentive literature is applicable to all multidivisional firms, the tax literature is 
applicable only to the subset of firms that also engage in intrafirm trade across tax 
jurisdictions.  Despite this subset being a sizeable and growing segment of the global 
economy, to date these two branches of inquiry have remained surprisingly separate. 
That is, there have been relatively few attempts to model both strategic and tax transfer 
prices together.'  Even in the analyses that do explicitly recognize the dual roles of 
transfer prices, the firm is invariably assumed to nominate only one transfer price per 
intrafirm transaction. (Halperin and Srinidhi, 1991; Elitzur and Mintz, 1996; Schjelderup 
and Sorgard, 1997; Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; Nielsen, et al., 200 1  a,b).  Specifically, 
these models, which are rooted in the tax literature, implicitly require that the tax transfer 
price do 'double duty', serving also as an incentive mechanism. 
This approach ignores important opportunities, and complexities, facing multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). In simple terms, it implicitly assumes that MNEs keep only one set 
of books to satisfy both cost and tax accounting requirements.  This can be criticized on 
theoretical grounds as it implies that MNEs are irrational. Logic dictates that a MNE 
cannot do worse by using two instruments instead of one to pursue tax and strategic 
goals, and in general will obtain a strictly higher profit.  On a practical level, it might be 
argued that this criticism is 'academic'  since it has been shown that most MNEs do not 
' We use the term 'strategic'  to refer to the transfer price that addresses incentive problems, since the need 
for this price arises from the strategic interaction of decision makers with different objectives.  In contrast, 
a firm's tax transfer price arises in response to the exogenously determined tax environment, employ separate transfer prices for incentive and tax purposes.2 While it is unknown 
whether this still remains true today, it is certainly plausible that the increased scrutiny of 
transfer pricing by tax authorities in the last twenty years will have led more MNlEs to 
recognize the benefit of employing two different transfer prices.3 Thus, while our model 
can be viewed as a normative analysis of transfer pricing, to the extent that the MNEs do 
in fact distinguish between tax and strategic transfer prices, it can also be viewed as a 
positive  analysis of transfer pricing.4 
We ask four separate questions, all centering on the nature of relationship between the 
optimal tax and strategic transfer prices.  First, does the relationship depend on whether 
the separate entity or  formula apportionment approaches are used to determine taxable 
in~ome?~  Second, how do changes in the MNEs tax and cost environment affect the 
relationship?  Third, what are the implications of oligopoly vis-a-vis monopoly for the 
relationship?  Lastly, is it affected by whether double taxation or 'less than single' 
taxation  occur^?^ 
Penalties for noncompliance with arm's length pricing have previously been modeled, but 
only in the context of a pure tax model -  incentive problems were absent (Kant, 1988; 
Kant, 1990). By recognizing that non-arm's length pricing leaves MNEs vulnerable to 
penalties we are better able to understand the real world interactions between the strategic 
and tax transfer prices.  Note, however, that the realities of penalty exposure are more 
complicated than our model suggests. For example, tax authorities typically make 
Chechowicz, et al., (1982) reported that 89% of U.S. MNE's use the same transfer price for incentive and 
tax purposes. 
As tax transfer pricing regulations become more narrowly defined and effectively enforced, MNEs that 
employ only one transfer price will find it increasingly difficult to implement the price that optimally trades 
off both tax and strategic considerations.  On the other hand, Chechowicz, et al., (1982) reported that some 
MNE's felt that tax authorities would be antagonistic toward the use of two different transfer prices. 
We do not, however, model the costs due to the increased complexity of using two prices rather than one. 
5 The formula apportionment approach refers to the use of a formula based on consolidated sales, assets, 
payroll and possibly other factors to allocate consolidated taxable income among the MNE's affiliates.  In 
contrast, the separate entity approach treats each affiliate as if it were a legally separate entity in 
determining their taxable income,  This approach is embraced by the OECD and effectively the global 
standard for international transfer pricing (OECD, 1995).  Others have referred to this as the 'separate 
accounting' approach -  our terminology is consistent with OECD usage and, we feel, more suggestive. 
The term 'less than single taxation' is the opposite of double taxation -  it refers to the situation where 
some income is not taxed in either jurisdiction. adjustments to transfer prices that they deem not to be arm's length.'  Our purpose here is 
not to render a model that is realistic in all respects, but rather to examine the nature of 
the role of penalties in MNI;: decision-making. 
We assume decentralized decision making in the sense that the subsidiary determines the 
amount it purchases from its parent,8 Also, the parent has afirst-mover  advantage -  it 
sets the transfer prices first, then the subsidiary reacts.  Given the power that a parent 
naturally has over its subsidiary, this is a sensible assumption.9 The subsidiary 
maximizes its own, rather than consolidated, after-tax profit, implying a misalignment of 
incentives from the parent's perspective.'0 Both the subsidiary and the parent are 
assumed to be monopolists in their own market.  We show that this market structure is 
sufficient to motivate the separate roles of strategic and tax transfer prices. 
Under the formula apportionment (FA) approach to determining taxable income, we 
show that a simple two-stage procedure can be employed to solve for the two transfer 
prices.  First the optimal tax transfer price is deduced, which is then used to solve for the 
optimal strategic transfer price.  This same procedure can be used under the separate 
entity (SE) approach to determining taxable income if there is no penalty for 
noncompliance with arm's length pricing.  In the presence of penalties, however, the 
strategic and tax transfer prices must be solved for simultaneously -  the two-stage 
procedure cannot be used.  The strategic and tax transfer prices are shown typically not to 
be equal under all scenarios examined, implying that models that do not distinguish 
between the two transfer prices understate MNE (after-tax) profit and overstate the 
adverse effect of a harsher tax regime. 
'  Although this possibility is not allowed for in our model, such adjustments could possibly be viewed as 
being implicitly embedded in the penalty. 
Subsidiaries often have considerable autonomy in decision-making.  In fact, it is not uncommon for the 
subsidiary and parent to even negotiate transfer prices. 
9 Our model differs from Nielsen, et al. (2001a) in that we assume the parent determines its domestic sales 
quantity at the same time as the transfer prices, thus meaning that it sets its quantity prior to the subsidiary 
-they  assume the parent and subsidiary quantities to be determined simultaneously.  Given that they 
compete in different markets, this difference seems unimportant. 
'O This misalignment need not be detrimental to the parent in an oligopolistic setting, due to the potential 
benefits of delegation (Vickers, 1985).  See Elitzur and Mintz (1996) for an analysis of transfer pricing in 
the context of unobservable managerial effort. More importantly, changes in the tax environment are shown to affect both the tax and 
strategic transfer prices.  Specifically, as the penalty for noncompliance with arm's length 
pricing increases or the likelihood of being penalized increases, a more conservative tax 
transfer price is adopted.  In addition, the strategic transfer price simultaneously adjusts 
so as to buffer the effect of the tax transfer price adjustment on the subsidiary's decision 
making -  that is, to minimize the induced change in the subsidiary purchases from its 
parent.  Thus, the strategic transfer price plays a compensatory role, serving to mitigate 
the negative flow-on effects of the increase in the tax transfer price. 
We then examine how a change in the MNE's cost structure affects the two transfer 
prices.  This complements the analysis above by allowing us to understand the effect of 
non-tax changes in the economic environment. Assuming the parent faces a lower tax 
rate than the subsidiary, an increase in the parent's marginal cost of production causes the 
strategic transfer price to increase and the tax transfer price to decrease.  The former 
induces the subsidiary to purchase less from the parent, an efficient response since the 
good has become more costly to produce.  The decrease in the tax transfer price 
reinforces the subsidiary's incentive to reduce its purchases. 
It is unclear, however, why the parent would adjust both transfer prices in order to lower 
the subsidiary's purchases.  Given that the tax regime remains unchanged, why alter the 
tax transfer price when the desired effect can be achieved by increasing the strategic 
transfer price alone?  In fact, the observed decrease in the tax transfer price is motivated 
by other considerations, being a flow-on effect from the adjustment in the strategic 
transfer price.  As the subsidiary decreases it purchases, the tax transfer price becomes 
less effective in the sense of shifting less profit back to the parent.  Given that the penalty 
for noncompliance with arm's length pricing remains unchanged, it is rational for the 
parent to decrease the tax transfer price so as to reduce their penalty exposure -this 
restores equality of the marginal benefit and marginal cost associated with varying the tax 
transfer price. 
Our analysis thus shows that changes in the MNE's tax environment, cost structure or 
strategic environment can have implications for both its strategic policy and its tax policy.  Thus, an integrated approach is required in identifying the m's  optimal 
transfer pricing policies.  Previous analyses have failed to recognize this fact, 
We show that our results are robust in the sense of also holding an oligopolistic setting. 
The reason is that, while competitive strategy needs also to be taken into consideration 
when setting the strategic transfer price under oligopoly, its basic role (as an incentive 
mechanism) remains unchanged.  Specifically, an increase in the strategic transfer price 
induces the subsidiary to purchase less from the parent regardless of whether it is a 
monopolist or oligopolist.  Moreover, we show that our findings are also robust to less 
than single or double taxation.  Both outcomes are very real possibilities, being a key 
motivation for the growing number of international tax treaties we see today. 
We begin in section 3 by examining how both the strategic and tax transfer prices are set 
under both the FA and SE approaches.  In section 4 we introduce penalties for 
noncompliance with the arm's length principle.  The implications of transfer pricing in an 
oligopolistic setting are discussed in section 5. In section 6 we examine how our results 
are affected by both double taxation and less than single taxation.  Concluding comments 
are made in section 7. 
2.  Model 
We consider a multinational enterprise (W)  that consists of two affiliates, A and B. 
Affiliate A produces and markets an amount q~ of a good in country A, while affiliate B 
purchases an amount q~ of the good from affiliate A at price s and markets it in country 
B.  The amount q~ is determined by affiliate B, while the transfer price, s,  is determined 
by affiliate A.  Affiliate A should thus be thought of as the parent company and affiliate 
B its subsidiary.  Both affiliates are monopolists in their own market. 
Affiliate A's cost is given by C(q, + q,) ,  where C1(.)  > 0 and C"(.)  2  0. For simplicity 
we assume that marketing and distribution costs for both affiliates are zero, so affiliate 
B's only cost is that of purchasing product from A.  Demand in market A is described by 
pA(q)  wherepA  denotes the price in market A.  Similarly, demand in market B is denoted 
ps(q) and market revenue is denoted by RA(~)  and RB(~).  The only assumptions we make about demand, in addition to the law of demand, are RA"(.) < 0,  Reu(.) < 0, 
I I  RAU'(-)  = Re"'(.) = 0 and  lim RBr(qB)  =  +w. 
4840 
From a separate entity perspective, the pre-tax profit of the two affiliates is 
- 
EA  =  RA(~A)-C(~A  +qg)+~qe,  (1) 
ZB  =  Rs(qe)-sqe.  (2) 
After-tax profit for both affiliates is determined by the tax rate in each jurisdiction, TA  and 
TB, and the determination of taxable income.  Taxable income, in contrast to pre-tax 
profit, is a function of the transfer price, t, the MNE nominates for tax purposes.  Taxable 
income is given by 
Id  =  RA(qA)-C(qA  +qs)+fqe, 
1,  =  Re(qe)-tqB. 
We  impose the restriction t 2  0, reflecting that losses in country B cannot be applied 
against affiliate A's taxable income in order to lower their tax liability.  The upper bound 
on t,  denoted by T,  is the transfer price that implies zero taxable income for affiliate B.'~ 
Under the separate entity approach, after-tax profit is given by13 
=  =  (l-~A)CRA(qA)-C(qA+qg)l+(s-~dt)qB  (3) 
Affiliate B chooses q~  to maximize its own after-tax profit, 7tF, while affiliate A 
chooses q~,  s and t in order to maximize consolidated after-tax profit, E;~  = 7tiE  +nF 
Denoting the arm's length price of the good by a, recall that s ;e a does not imply 
noncompliance with the arm's length principle -  this occurs only if t ;t a.I4 
"  The last assumption simply rules out the possibility that gi  = 0. 
12 That is, we implicitly assume that losses in country B cannot be applied against country A profits in order 
to lower affiliate A's taxation -  this is realistic. 
l3 Note thar we assume taxation occurs at source, not residence.  Although this assumption is consistent 
with the general thrust ofthe OECD model tax treaty, some countries (e.g., the U.S.) still tax worldwide 
income, granting tax credits for foreign taxes paid.  Our analysis can also be applied to case of residence 
taxation provided TA < z~. 
l4 Under perfectly competitive conditions, a equals the marginal cost of production.  Under all other market 
structures a is more difficult to determine, depending upon the degree of buyer and seller market power.  In We compare the MNE's transfer pricing incentives under the separate entity (SE) 
approach to those under the formula apportionment (FA) approach to taxation.  Profits 
under the SE approach are described by Equations (1)-(4).  While in principle the FA 
approach allows for an affiliate's profit to be calculated as a function of its share of 
consolidated payroll, sales, assets and other factors, we follow previous analyses by 
focusing solely on sales as the allocation key.  Defining a, 5 q, / (q,  + qB)  and a, 
similarly, after-tax profit under the FA approach is given by 
Affiliate A moves first, setting its output level and the two transfer prices, (q, ,  s,  t)  . 
Affiliate B observes these choices and then reacts by choosing qB  . Using backwards 
induction, we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
3.  Separate Entity and Formula Apportionment Approaches 
A preliminary comment on the monopolistic market structure is warranted.  A benefit of 
employing this market structure is that it allows us to strip away the strategic interactions 
between competitors, thus simplifying the analysis.  On the other hand, by definition 
there exists no arm's length price in a monopolistic market, raising questions as to the 
relevance of the analysis -  especially in relation to the separate entity approach. 
Our view is that the arm's length price here should be viewed as a notional price, 
determined by the tax authorities to be 'reasonable'.  Taking this perspective, there is no 
inherent conflict in studying transfer pricing in the context of a monopolistic market 
reality, tax authorities define a range of acceptable prices, usually the interquartile range obtained from 
analyzing a set of comparable firms. structure.'* Moreover, we establish in section 5 that little is to be gained by studying a 
more competitive market structure. 
In order to determine affiliate A's transfer pricing incentives, we must first determine 
how q~ varies with both s and t. Recall that affiliate B maximizes their after-tax profit, 
given by Equations (4) and (6) under the SE and FA approaches respectively.  Affiliate A 
then takes into account Affiliate B's reaction function in determining how to optimally 
set the two transfer prices (and its own quantity). 
3.1.  The Formula Apportionment Approach 
Inspecting Equation (6) we see that affiliate B's after-tax profit is a function of s but not t, 
implying that its profit maximizing quantity, q;,  is also a function of s but not t. 
Assuming concavity of affiliate B's after-tax profit function, it is straightforward to show 
that dqi / ds < 0. That is, the law of demand is satisfied. 
Although consolidated after-tax profit, rt?  =  rt?  -t  ltF ,  also does not depend directly 
on either s or t, it does depend indirectly on s through the functional relationship q;  (s)  . 
It follows that affiliate A, while indifferent between all possible tax transfer prices, will 
typically have a strict preference over the level of the strategic transfer price. 
Result 1.  Under FA, there is no incentive to distort the tax transferprice away from  the 
arm's length price.  However, the strategic and tax transfer prices will typically not be 
equal: s';e t * . 
ProoJ  The first statement follows immediately from the fact that dlt?  /dt = 0. TO 
assess the second statement, suppose initially that under some environment s*=  t*= a . 
Now consider a perturbation, Aa, in the arm's length price.  Since consolidated after-tax 
profit is independent of a, so also is s*  . However, it remains true that t* = a. 
The first part of this result is identical to that obtained by Nielsen, et al. (2001a), 
implying that the result that under monopoly there is nothing to be gained from distorting 
l5 This is not an unrealistic scenario.  Tax authorities often have to deal with the transfer of unique 
intangibles between related parties, in which case monopoly is the appropriate market description. 
Nonetheless, this does not prevent the application of arm's length-based transfer pricing guidelines the tax transfer price when applying the FA approach is robust.  The reason is that 
consolidated profit is independent of the tax transfer price regardless of whether one 
distinguishes between the strategic and tax transfer prices, 
The second part establishes that it is nonetheless important to distinguish between the two 
transfer prices under the FA approach. If not, then the fact that affiliate A is able to use 
the strategic transfer price to exert influence over affiliate B's decision making is 
overlooked.  Moreover, ignoring the distinction between the two transfer prices will 
result in an understatement of the MNE's after-tax profit.  That is, the MNE must be 
worse off if it is constrained to set two prices equal when it would prefer to let them 
differ -  failing to distinguish between the two transfer prices is equivalent to assuming 
they are always equal, 
3.2. The Separate Entity Approach 
Affiliate B's after-tax profit is now given by Equation (4) and it can be shown that 
Now affiliate B is affected by both transfer prices, although they have opposite effects on 
its quantity choice.  While an increase in s again results in a decrease in affiliate B7s 
purchases (for the reasons noted above), an increase in t actually benefits affiliate B by 
reducing its taxable income and thus also its tax payable. 
Affiliate A must take into account that qi varies with both s and t when determining the 
optimal level of the two transfer prices.  Consolidated after-tax profit is given by 
It is possible to discern affiliate A's transfer pricing incentives directly from this 
expression. Result 2.  Under the SE approach there is an incentive to choose a non-arm 's length tax 
transfer price.  The tax and strategic transfer prices will typically not be equal. 
Proof: Suppose .c~  <  TB and t'c T . Inspecting Equation (9) it can be seen that, holding 
qi constant, n;SE  is increasing with t and independent of s. Also, q;  remains constant if 
As  =  '~g  At, this being implied by Equations (7) and (8).  It follows that 
ny(T,  qi) > niCE (t*,qi)  ,  contradicting the optimality of to. Thus, we have'd a, t'  = T . 
The same logic applies in the case of .c~  2 TB,  where 'd  a,  t'  =.  0. 
The second statement requires only that it be recognized that any solution satisfying 
s'  = r* is not generic.  That is, if in fact s'  = t'  ,  then a slight perturbation in the model 
parameterization causes this equality to fail.  The easiest way to see this is to suppose a 
small decrease, AT, in the upper bound on t. Since .c~  <  TB  implies t* = T ,  by the 
envelope theorem q;  remains unchanged.  However, from Equations (7) and (8), it 
follows that s decreases by As  =  TB  At <  At, implying that now s' ;t  t'  a 
The MNE now has a clear incentive to distort the tax transfer price because, as can be 
seen from Equation (9), it directly impacts upon consolidated after-tax profit.  Quite 
simply, given the absence of any penalty exposure, the MNE should seek to shift as much 
taxable income as possible into the low tax jurisdiction.  This idea is not new, being 
central to almost all discussions, both practical and theoretical, of transfer pricing. 
Also, again we see that the MNE benefits from setting different strategic and tax transfer 
prices. This is simply because the two prices serve distinct and different purposes - 
profit-shifting and the provision of incentives for affiliate B.  Thus, regardless of the 
approach to calculating taxable income, models that fail to distinguish between the two 
transfer prices fail to capture the fbll complexities of transfer pricing. 
3.3.  Summary 
Comparing our results to those of Nielsen, et al. (20Ola), who do not distinguish between 
the strategic and tax transfer prices, we draw the following conclusion. 
Proposition 1.  The tax transferpricing incentives under the SE and FA approaches are 
independent of whether the MNE employs different transfer prices for  strategic and tax 
purposes. Proofi  This follows from comparison of Results 1 and 2 with Proposition 1 in Nielsen, et 
al. (2001a). 
We have established that if the MNE is a monopolist then its incentives in regards to tax 
transfer pricing can be understood without reference to its transfer pricing for strategic 
purposes.  Under the SE approach it has an incentive to set its tax transfer price as high 
(low) as possible if the tax rate in the producing country, is lower (higher) than the tax 
rate in the purchasing country.  In contrast, under the FA approach the MNE has nothing 
to gain from choosing a transfer price different from the arm's length price. Both results 
hold regardless of whether the MNE sets only one transfer price or distinguishes between 
the strategic and tax transfer prices. 
That the MNE's tax transfer pricing incentives are independent of the strategic transfer 
price reflects the fact that the tax transfer pricing incentives are particularly robust. 
Neither result, however, is a particularly appealing description of the incentives facing 
real-world MNEs.  Moreover, it is clear that in the context of the SE approach, breaking 
the result requires the introduction of penalties for noncompliance with arm's length 
pricing.  By mitigating the MNE's incentive to engage in profit shifting, penalties may 
also help to Uncover a meaningful relationship between the optimal strategic and tax 
transfer prices.'6 On the other hand, intuition suggests that even penalties will not alter 
the tax transfer pricing incentives under the FA approach. 
4.  Transfer Pricing Penalties 
If a MNE distorts its tax transfer prices away from arm's length prices, in reality there is 
a risk of being penalized by the tax authorities in the jurisdiction that deems its revenue 
base to have been eroded."  Recalling that the arm's length price is a,  we now assume 
that affiliate A has some probability of being penalized an amount P > 0 when choosing a 
l6  Technically speaking, the essence of the relationship between s*  and t* is more likely to be apparent in 
settings in which there exists a unique, interior solution to t*  . 
"  The realities of penalty exposwe are complicated and we do not attempt a full exposition here.  It is 
worth noting, though, that tax authorities typically make adjustments to transfer prices deemed not to be 
arm's length.  This possibility is not explicitly factored into our model, although such adjustments could 
possibly be viewed as being implicitly embedded in the penalty. non-arm's length tax transfer price,'8  This probability is described by the cumulative 
distribution function F(lt-  a/), where F(0) = 0 and F(Z- a) =.  1, Thus, if affiliate A 
chooses t >  iT ,  they will be penalized with certainty. The associated probability 
distribution function is denotedjllt -  a/), satisfymgjlo) =  0 andY(1t -  a/)  > 0.19 To 
simplify the analysis we assume that TA  <  'tg,  in which case there is no loss of generality 
in restricting attention to t 2 a.20 
4.1.  The Formula Apportionment Approach 
Under the FA approach there is no rationale for penalties for noncompliance with arm's 
length pricing since we saw in section 3.1 that affiliate A has no incentive to deviate from 
arm's length pricing even in the absence of penalties.  The only effect of introducing 
penalties is to ensure that affiliate A has a strict preference for choosing t'  =a,  whereas 
in the absence of penalties they were indifferent as to the level of the tax transfer price. 
However, since we assumed that affiliate A chose t'  =a when indifferent, the 
introduction of penalties has no effect on our equilibrium prediction. 
Since the penalty does not interact directly with the strategic transfer price in the 
expression for ny,  it follows that the introduction of the penalty also does not affect 
affiliate A's incentives in relation to the strategic transfer price. 
Result 3, Penaltiesfor noncompliance with arm 's  length pricing have no effect on the 
strategic or  tax transfer prices under FA. 
This result is not surprising as there is no incentive problem here for the penalty to solve. 
The notion of arm's length principle is really only of interest in the context of the SE 
approach to determining taxable income. 
4.2, The Separate Entity Approach 
18 The penalty is assumed to be levied on after-tax profits.  Modeling the penalty as being levied on B 
rather than A would not affect our results. 
19 Note that /'  .s 0 implies that as r increases, the probability of being penalized increases at an increasing 
rate.  This seems plausible and perhaps even likely. 
That is, the MNE has an incentive to set a high (tax) transfer price when the tax rate in country A is low. 
The analysis below can also be applied directly to the case where TA > G,  only then we have t 5 a. Consolidated after-tax profits are now given by 
The first-order conditions describing the profit-maximizing values (s*,  r', q;)  are 
Provided the penalty is sufficiently high, affiliate A's profit maximizing tax transfer price 
is now characterized by an interior solution. That is, unlike in section 3.2, affiliate A no 
longer shifts as much income as possible to the low tax jurisdiction.  To see this note that 
the expression in square brackets in Equation (12) must equal zero,  This means that 
Equation (1 1) reduces to 
The optimal tax transfer price cannot satisfy r 5 a since this ensures that the right hand 
side is zero while, recalling footnote 11 and the restriction TA <  TB, we know that the left 
hand side is strictly positive.  On the other hand, for all t 1  a,  if the penalty is sufficiently 
high then the right hand side is greater than the left. Thus, by the Intermediate Value 
Theorem, we have r* E (a, z') . 
We are interested in understanding the relationship between s*  and to.  This is achieved 
by examining how they vary with the underlying parameters of the model, such as the 
penalty.  In order to simplify the analysis, we make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. 
(a)  Consolidated after-tax profit is concave in s  x r x q,  . 
(b) C"(q  A  + 9,)  = 0. Assumption l(a) is natural to the extent that we are concerned here only with 
characterizing equilibria that exist -  we are not interested in isolating conditions under 
which existence is guaranteed.21 Assumption l(b) simplifies the analysis by breaking the 
link between the two markets through the cost hnction. By assuming a constant 
marginal cost of production, ql and  gi can be solved for independently rather than 
simultaneously. 
Proposition 2.  Both the optimal strategic and tax transfer prices decrease as (a) the 
penalty for  non-arm 's length pricing increases, and (3)  the probability of beingpenalized 
increases. 
Proof:  (a) Taking into account Assumption 1, totally differentiating Equations (1  1)-(13) 
and applying Crarner's Rule gives 
(b) Similarly, 
=  sign[$}  =  sign{P%]  <  o  sign - 
The fact that the tax transfer price decreases as the penalty for noncompliance with the 
arm's length principle increases or the probability of being penalized increases is not 
surprising -  the latter was also observed by Kant (1988). In contrast, the result that the 
strategic transfer price also decreases with the penalty is more interesting.  It establishes 
that there is indeed a connection between the tax environment and the strategic policy of 
the MNE. In other words, a change in various aspects of the tax regime does not affect 
only the tax transfer price, but also affects the transfer price used to provide strategic 
incentives to the subsidiary. 
But what is the purpose of this adjustment to the strategic transfer price?  Is it defensive, 
in the sense of simply trying to preserve the MNE's competitive position in each market, 
or is it offensive in the sense of trying to restore the effectiveness of the ME'S  profit 
shifting strategy? The latter argument is that the MNE might respond to the harsher 
2 1 Given Assumption l(b), concavity is ensured provided  P  is sufficiently large. This is not surprising 
given the preceding discussion. penalties by placing more reliance on the strategic transfer price as the mechanism to 
achieve profit-shifting goals. In other words, the strategic and tax transfer prices may be 
viewed as being substitutes to some extent. 
In fact, the adjustment in the strategic transfer price is more in the nature of a defensive 
reaction to the harsher penalty. Referring back to Equation (10) it can be seen that s does 
not directly affect consolidated after-tax profit, rather entering only indirectly through 
affiliate B's choice of output, q, . In other words, the strategic transfer price cannot be 
used as an instrument to shift profits.  Rather, the adjustment ins  serves simply to 
minimize the disruption in country B caused by the change in the tax transfer price.  As t 
decreases, we know from Equation (8) that affiliate B reacts by decreasing q,.  This is 
not desirable for affiliate A as it results in the marginal benefit in country B being higher 
than the marginal cost of production. Thus, affiliate A responds by simultaneously 
decreasing the strategic transfer price, which we know from Equation (7) results in an 
offsetting increase in q, . 
Having established how the optimal transfer prices vary in response to a change in the 
MNE's tax environment, we now examine how they vary with the MNE's cost 
environment. In particular, we analyze how s'  and t* vary as affiliate A's marginal cost 
of production increases. 
Proposition 3. An increase in the marginal cost ofproduction results in an increase in 
the optimal strategic transfer price and a decrease in the optimal tax transfer price. 
Proof: Taking into account Assumption 1, totally differentiating Equations (1 1)-(13) and 
applying Cramer's rule gives 
The expression on the left is clearly positive if P  is sufficiently large, which is implied 
by Assumption l(a). 
Also, by the same process, 
sign idt'  -  ]  =  sign((l +'*)(I 
dC'  ds  dt We would expect both q; and qi  to decrease in response to an increase in the marginal 
cost of production -  this follows simply from the requirement that marginal revenue and 
marginal cost be equated and the fact that marginal revenue decreases with output.  While 
affiliate A controls q,,  the only way for it to implement the reduction in q, is to vary s 
and t in such a way as to induce affiliate B to reduce q;.  Equations (7) and (8) indicate 
that this requires some combination of increasing s  and reducing t. 
But why doesn't affiliate A use the strategic transfer price alone to implement the change 
in  q,?  After all, varying s  affects only q, and introduces no other distortions while, on 
the contrary, varying t affects not only q, but also the extent of profit shifting. However, 
given that the tax regime is unchanged, it is not obvious why affiliate A would want to 
alter the amount of profit it shifts back to country A. 
The answer is that affiliate A increases the tax transfer price up to the point where the 
marginal benefit from increasing it further is just equal to the marginal cost.  The 
marginal benefit is a function of the amount of profit that can be shifted out of country B, 
while the marginal cost is a function of the magnitude of the penalty.  For example, if q; 
is low and the penalty is high, then affiliate A has a strong incentive to lower the tax 
transfer price.  Indeed, we have seen that as the marginal cost of production increases, s' 
increases and causes qi  to fall.  Thus, the marginal benefit from increasing t is now 
lower than what it was before, while the marginal costs remain unchanged (since the 
penalty is unchanged).  Profit maximization requires then that affiliate A make a 
downward adjustment to the tax transfer price. 
Thus, we see that the relationship between the two transfer prices can be complicated and 
not always easy to anticipate. Following a change in the MNEYs  economic environment, 
they may move in the same direction or in opposite directions, depending on the nature of 
the change.  Also, the change in the tax transfer price may drive, or be driven by, the 
associated change in the strategic transfer price.  Models that do not distinguish between 
the two transfer prices necessarily fail to appreciate these possibilities and complexities. 5.  Oligopoly 
It is natural to ask whether our results extend to market settings involving oligopoly since 
this a more realistic scenario than monopoly. Moreover, the richer strategic interactions 
due to interfirm rivalry seem likely to result in a more complex, and perhaps realistic, 
relationship between the strategic and tax transfer prices.  Indeed, this is suggested by 
Nielsen et al., (2001a), whose analysis of the FA approach purports to show that the 
MNE has an incentive to distort the transfer price under oligopoly but not under 
monopoly. 
We show here that, apart from providing a more realistic setting, the move from 
monopoly to oligopoly adds little to our understanding of the interrelationship between 
the two transfer prices.  This is not to deny, however, that introducing competition in 
country B brings new considerations to bear.  Specifically, if rivals compete in quantities 
in country B, it is well understood that affiliate A has a stronger incentive to set s lower 
under oligopoly because this turns affiliate B into a low cost competitor.  This allows it to 
increase market share, which in turn increases consolidated profits (Vickers, 1985; 
SMivas, 1987). However, the primary effect of this delegation benefit is to impact upon 
the equilibrium level of so,  rather than the comparative statics properties of s'  and t'. 
Proposition 4.  Propositions 2 and 3 hold also ifaflliate B is a duopolist engaging in 
quantity competition. 
Prooj  It follows from the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 that it is required only to 
establish that dqi / dt > 0 and dqi / ds < 0 . Supposing that affiliate B's competitor, firm 
C, produces output q, at cost K(q, ) ,  where KW(q,  ) r 0,  the first-order conditions for B 
and C respectively are 
(l-r,)[p,  + p,'q,l-(s-z,t)  =  0, 
Assuming concavity of both B and C's after-tax profit functions and denoting the second 
order conditions by  (1 -  z, )S, and (1 -  z, )S, respectively, we have  S, <  0 and S, < 0. 
Totally differentiating and applying Cramer's rule gives In the monopoly setting, affiliate A uses s to provide the appropriate incentives to 
affiliate B in relation to their purchase decision, g,  . Moving to oligopoly requires 
affiliate A to work through another layer of complexity in solving for the optimal 
strategic transfer price -  it must anticipate not only affiliate B's response to a given pair 
of transfer prices, but their rivalsi responses to affiliate B's response.  However, the fact 
that s defines affiliate B's unit cost is just as true under oligopoly as under monopoly. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a market setting in which qi  increases with s. 
Conversely, an increase in t causes affiliate B's effective marginal cost to decrease since 
it lowers taxable income in proportion to q,.  Again, it is hard to imagine a market 
structure in which an increase in t would cause affiliate B to respond by decreasing g,. 
This suggests that Proposition 4 holds for a much broader range of market structures than 
we have shown, implying that our results are indeed very robust. 
The impression given by Nielsen, et al. (2001a) that oligopoly gives rise to important 
strategic interactions that are not observed in monopoly is misleading.  In their analysis 
of the FA approach under monopoly they state, ". .  . even if the MNE can manipulate the 
transfer price within some limits, the transfer price does not have a meaningful role as a 
profit shifting device."  However, the reason for this is that under monopoly they 
implicitly assurne that affiliate A that chooses q,,  in which case there is clearly no need 
to craft the transfer price so as to offer affiliate B appropriate incentives -  affiliate B has 
no decision making ability. 
In contrast, under oligopoly they assume affiliate B chooses q,,  giving rise to a strategic 
role for the transfer price that was not observed under monopoly.  A strategic role under 
monopoly would have existed, however, had they allowed affiliate B to choose q,  in this 
setting also.  That is, the source of this strategic role is not the oligopolistic market setting 
but rather the decentralization of decision-making -  we demonstrate this in section 3.1. 6,  Less than Single (and Double) Taxation 
Two important goals of all international tax treaties are the elimination of both 'double' 
and 'less than single' taxation. That is, tax authorities agree that income should be taxed 
once, not more and not less.  Many of the issues that arise in competent authority 
negotiations -  for example, source versus residence taxation -  are rooted in the above- 
mentioned principle. Indeed, the benefit of using the formula apportionment approach to 
calculating taxable income is that it essentially eliminates the possibility for double or 
less than single taxation. It does this by using a simple key upon which to allocate 
consolidated pre-tax profit amongst the affiliates of the SvflV1E, thus ensuring that all profit 
gets allocated (and thus taxed) once and only once. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the separate entity approach is more susceptible 
to both double and less than single taxation. The reason is that the tax authorities in each 
country typically act independently in assessing the taxable income of the affiliate in their 
jurisdiction.  Not sharing information leaves them vulnerable to the possibility that, 
through error of judgment or calculation by one or both authorities, some income is either 
taxed twice or not at all, In contrast, the FA approach effectively avoids this problem by 
implicitly centralizing the taxation process.  To see this, note that in order for the FA 
approach to be implemented, the two tax authorities must reach agreement on the 
magnitude of the MNEl's  consolidated taxable income and also how to allocate this 
income between the affiliates. 
It might be further argued that there is more scope for less than single taxation than there 
is for double taxation, given that each affiliate has recourse to the competent authority 
procedure if they suffer double taxation. In contrast, affiliates have no incentive to reveal 
mistakes resulting in less than single 
We inquire here whether either double taxation or less than single taxation have any 
impact on ow  results in the previous section.  In particular, do the roles of the two 
22 The tax audit process is the only means by which such mistakes are uncovered, although this is a random 
process. transfer prices change at all?  It might be conjectured, for example, that less than single 
taxation gives rise to the possibility that the strategic transfer price has not only an 
indirect, but also a direct, effect on consolidated after-tax profits.  This would result in the 
strategic transfer price assuming a profit-shifting role in addition to its strategic hction, 
thus adding further layers of complexity in understanding the relationship between the 
two transfer prices. 
We pursue this line of inquiry by assuming that while taxable income is correctly 
assessed in country B, either double or less than single taxation may occur in country A. 
Less than single taxation involves the tax authority assessing taxable income to be less 
than what it is in reality.  Letting FA denote assessed taxable income in country A, less 
than single taxation requires that  <I,  . Similarly, double taxation requires that 
* 
I, >  IA  . 
Proposition 5. Propositions 1-3 are unaffected by less than single or double taxation. 
Proof: Suppose that & =  p I,, where p >  0.  Consolidated after-tax profit is now 
Z;S";  =  (l-'Ap)LRA  (gA)  -C(qA + qB)]'  (l-'B)RB  (qB)  -  ['A@  -'El  tqB -  F(t  -a)P 
Letting  ?,  = p  z,  ,  consolidated after-tax profit can be rewritten as 
E;S";  =  (l-'A)[RA(qA)-C(qA  '4B)I '  (~-TB)~B(~B)-  [?A  -'Bit qB  -  F(t  -a)P 
But this expression is identical to Equation (10)  except that ?,  now replaces z,  . It 
follows immediately that, regardless of whether p >  1 or p <  1,  Proposition 2 remains 
unchanged. 
Proposition 5 establishes that our results do not depend in any important way on the 
accuracy or efficiency of the taxation system in the sense discussed above.  This adds 
Mher  credibility to the results we have obtained. 
7.  Conclusion 
The goal here has been to construct a more realistic and rational model of transfer 
pricing.  In particular, we have tried to draw out the relationship between the transfer 
price used for cost accounting purposes and the transfer price used for tax accounting 
purposes.  We have shown that this relationship can be complex and that changes in either price can drive changes in the other. Failing to recognize that MNEs can employ 
two transfer prices results in an inability to recognize the full complexity of how MNEs 
can respond to changes its underlying economic environment. For example, changes in 
the tax environment can induce changes in the MNE's internal cost accounting policies, 
The model employed here is simplistic in many respects and there is considerable scope 
for further research to better understand how MNEs determine their transfer prices.  For 
example, it would be useful to model more carefully the institutional details surrounding 
tax transfer pricing, such as the ability of tax authorities to make adjustments to transfer 
prices, the conditions under which this occurs and the determinants of the magnitude of 
the adjustments. Also, modeling the link between the size of the penalty and the 
magnitude of the adjustment could increase our understanding of how MNEs choose their 
transfer prices. References 
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